ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
Deregulation to electric power industries has been undergoing during past two decades. The monopolized operation with integrated generation, transmission and distribution has been unbundled into many generation companies, independent transmission organization (ISO) and many distribution utilities. The introduction of competition into each section has brought substantial changes to power industry's operation and management, and a large number of novel economical and technical issues are arising in every area of power systems.
For the importance and particularity of electric power industry, deregulation of power industries in different countries have different processes. But most are firstly introduced competition into generation area, some are opening competition in transmission and distribution sectors, even electricity retails, simultaneously, e.g., Nordic Power Market, PJM Power Market, etc. The fact has shown that the emphasis only putting on generation competition, not on distribution, is not beneficial to the health development of power markets, and possible to induce market power and price volatility. A large number of researches have put on the domains of generation and transmission but little attention paid on distribution sector. This paper makes a survey on newly technical and economical issues faced by electric distribution utilities under market environment. This paper firstly introduces the current situation of the distribution utilities in power markets, then puts the emphasis on the discussion on several economical and technical problems faced by utilities under deregulation, including electric load forecast and electricity price forecast, optimal operation, demand side bidding, distribution pricing, power quality, distribution planning, arbitrage and risk hedging, etc., lastly proposes a whole operation framework of power markets involving distribution competition.
ELECTRIC DISTRIBUTION UTILITIES
It is the responsibility of the electric distribution utility for receiving electric power from high voltage transmission network, then transferring to low voltage to distribution network, to fulfil electric energy allocation and balance, and to provide qualified electricity supply service by dispatching, operation and control.
After the electric industry unbundling, there are large changes for electric utilities from planning, operation and management. Besides the above traditional functions, electric utilities are emerging a lot of new responsibilities, such as transaction management, market operation, etc., while the traditional functions also have large changes from the contents to the implementation methods. At present there are several market trading modes in terms of the openness level of markets: pool based trading mode, pool plus bilateral contracts mode, and retail mode. So the distribution utility faces more complicated environment than ever, have more opportunities for meeting the load demand by purchasing electric energy from the pool, or by bilateral contracts with the generator companies, and the contracts have different styles, for example, futures contracts, option contracts, forward contracts, etc., even the utility can dispatch own generation or sign interruptible load contracts with its customers. That means when the distribution utilities transform the operation from monopoly to market, not only the utilities face the changes of inherent technical problems, but large amount of new economical problems, such as high volatility of electricity price, gaming, the change of customers' electricity consumption style. All these changes bring demand side management and distribution planning new contents. The utilities have more large risks in fluctuating markets, so the utilities need new risk hedging measures.
The distribution deregulation has achieved different effects in different countries. Brazilian power market is a successful example at distribution deregulation [1] . The power system in Brazil was first privatelized in distribution sector. The distribution utilities are permitted to choose the electricity provider. After one year's deregulation the significant achievement has achieved with the utility's accumulated revenue increasing from US$ The same paper also points out due to the speciality of power system different from other commodity markets, only emphasizing on the competition in generation market or open access transmission, ignoring the potential of distribution participating in competition, is easy to induce market power, not helpful for healthy and sustained development of power markets.
KEY TECHNICAL AND ECONOMICAL PROBLEMS OF DISTRIBUTION UTILITIES Load and Price Forecasting
Load forecast and price forecast have an important role in distribution operation [3, 4] . Especially in deregulation environment, accurate forecasting has crucial influences on electricity procurement decision-making, optimal operation, load management and distribution planning. Load forecast or price forecast needs consider the crossover effect between load and price for load's elasticity with price [5] . When predicting the price, except all factors influencing load should be taken into account, the occasional generator failure has an effect on price, and the other conditions, such as the transmission grid's operation situation (congestion or not), the market trading mechanism (whether easy to induce market power), etc. have large influences on prices. So some approaches, e.g. ANN, Wavelet Analysis, Regressive analysis, even the combination of these methods are suggested for improving the forecast accuracy.
Optimal Operation
Distribution optimal operation mainly includes three parts: network reconfiguration, optimal dispatching and optimal load control. These issues are undergoing new changes in marketing operation. i) Network reconfiguration should take the bilateral contracts signed by generators and customers, and distributed generation, into account, so the objective and constraints are changed.
ii) Reactive power optimization is an important work in distribution operation that changes the switching capacity and position of reactive compensators, such as capacitors, reactors, etc., to improve power quality, and reduce power losses, etc. However reactive power is regarded as one of important auxiliary services after deregulation, which is no longer free of charge, its value and pricing is becoming an attractive research topic.
iii) With large amount of distributed generation connecting the distribution network, supervisory control and dispatching to these distributed units brings out some new problems, e.g. power flow control, the influences of distributed generation units to the system, such as: short circuit current, protection coordination, etc. It also makes the system's operation, dispatching and planning complicated.
iv) The electricity consumers have more incentives to participate in load control and frequency restoration, in the meantime they also propose higher demand to power quality and supply reliability, all these bring new requirements to distribution operation.
Demand Side Bidding
Demand Side Bidding (DSB) is a mechanism that enables customers to actively participate in electricity trading, by offering to undertake changes to their normal pattern of consumption. Rescheduling of loads, or agreed load reductions, can help maintain the balance between electricity supply and demand, and maintain the quality and security of supply. This could enable electricity prices to be reduced in the short term, and the number of generators and size of networks to be decreased in the long term. This may result in improved energy efficiency and reduced greenhouse gas emissions. So DSB is regarded as a kind of efficient implementation mechanism keeping the demand side management long-term development by means of changing electricity utilization modes, and getting economical benefit as the return. It makes the customers no longer price-taker. DSB can participate in auxiliary services, interruptible load control, peak-valley price program, spot market, and making bilateral contract with generators, or even bidding decreasing demand for alleviating transmission congestion, etc.
Distribution Pricing
Theoretically speaking, deregulation of power industry requires corresponding pricing methodology, which means the need of three-segment pricing mechanism: generation, transmission and distribution. In practice, generators can bid their generation capacity through markets to realize their value, and generators' bidding strategies research have been gotten fruitful achievements. Transmission pricing has also been widely researched and put into use in some power markets, while distribution pricing is still mostly regulated. In monopolized environment, distribution pricing is based on "rate-of-return" that means to determine a relatively fixed rate of return in a long time. This method has no incentive for utilities to improve the
efficiency and reduce the cost, is obviously not suitable for the fair competition. New price deregulation approaches are urged. Now price-cap regulation, Yardstick regulation and marginal cost pricing are main pricing and regulation methods.
Price-cap regulation means an upper limit for price by the governors, when the market price is higher than this limit, then the price is regulated at this level [6] . This cap is set by considering the cost of utilities, certain a rate of return, and other social and technical factors. This approach can bring efficient incentives to utilities, which has gotten obvious achievement in the British Power Markets.
Yardstick regulation method was proposed by Shleifer in 1985, which is an approach to regulate monopolized price [7] , the main idea is that the price of the individual utility should be decided by the average cost of utilities with the same type. Since different utilities have different supply domain, voltage and load density, simply taking the average cost of all utilities is unreasonable, so several kinds of "Model Utilities" are chosen as the representations for those with similar supply consumers and load density, e.g. suburb model, country model, high density city model, medium density city model, and low density city model, etc. And the average cost for certain model is calculated by weighted average of two separated costs computed by the utility self and the government department individually.
Marginal cost pricing (MC) is regarded by economists a method that can induce the maximum social benefit. MC is divided into long-term marginal cost pricing (LTMC), and short term marginal cost pricing (STMC). Wherein LTMC is more suitable for pricing distribution than STMC since it includes the investment and can reflect the increase of load and investment in a long period by analysing historical data. Considering the difference of utilities, the average marginal cost is suggested for distribution pricing.
Power Quality
In competitive power market, power quality (PQ) is an important part of supply reliability, and is getting more and more concerns by all participants [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] . With the increase of frequency changeable motors, programmable controllers, and high technical electronic equipments, the customers have higher demand for power quality since any interrupt or disturbance of electricity supply could produce large economical losses. In order to reduce the losses of users and electric utilities, efficient incentive mechanism and management measures are essential for stimulating both consumers and utilities to take effective measures to improve power quality and give correct market signals. Reference [9] proposed the approach of power quality market, and Reference [10] [11] [12] further presents the PQ market framework and relative technical and economical problems, such as: PQ standards, PQ disturbance recognition and location, and relative economical judgement criteria of PQ disturbances, even PQ market implementation mechanism, etc.
Distribution Planning
Distribution planning has new contents in competitive environment. The competition gives the consumers more opportunities. The consumers no longer receive electricity only from local supplier, but are possible to choose the preponderant, far away suppliers transferring electricity by distribution network and pay for wheeling tariff, or utilizing own distributed generation capacity, even undergoing energy storage. So, distribution planning at this situation not only consider the growth of electricity demand, but the market operating mode, consumers' preference, return of investment, etc., especially the following considerations worthy research [14, 15] .
i) Utilizing the present asset at the largest extend by analysing the maximum benefit of existing equipments. The optimal utilization rates of equipments should be dynamically calculated in terms of loss, rated capacity and environment by novel approaches needed to operate the equipments in order to increase the load capability of distribution network.
ii) Planning and design should be risk-based planning.
As it is not sure to receive total investment, so probability-based investment analysis and assessment method is necessary, for example, probable load estimation instead of previous determined value in planning process, and the maximum utility approach of the maximum benefit expectation and the least risk (variance of benefit) replacing the original planning technique.
iii) Reliability-based planning is also a novel approach in cases of the consumers having higher reliability demand.
iv) Integrated optimum technique considering not only conventional expansion, but also distribution automation, distributed generation and energy storage, demand side management, even reliability and risk hedging, and so on, is essential.
Demand-Side Management
Demand-Side Management (DSM) started as conservation and load management in the mid-1970s in the USA in response to the so-called energy crisis, DSM has already gone through tremendous change. And more is yet to come, especially when DSM transfers from mandates to markets. The primary objective of DSM is to restrain electric demand growth through conservation. It gradually evolved into a concerted effort to conserve energy and clip peak demand in the mid-1980s [16] . Now the new roles of DSM, e.g. the contribution to the system reliability and decrease of CO2 emission, are attracting more concerns.
Despite the original meaning of DSM, in the deregulation DSM should be market-based or market driven, which means not only the duty of utilities but customers having
equal participating opportunities and receiving reasonable benefits, e.g. the content and price of interruptible load contracts need new incentive mechanism [17] , game theory based or auction design are attractive approaches. The contribution of DSM to the system reliability is more valuable for research than ever [18] .
Arbitrage and Risk Hedging
Arbitrage refers to making profit by a simultaneous purchase and sale of the same or equivalent commodity with net-zero-investment and without or with little risk [19] . The usage of arbitrage also includes any activity that attempts to buy a relatively under-priced commodity and to sell a similar and relatively over-priced commodity for profit. The act of arbitrage depends on three elements: objective, opportunity and means. The profit opportunity for arbitrage (source) is due to price discrepancies between the same or equivalent commodities. The means of realizing arbitrage is the purchase and sale of the same or equivalent commodities. For example, gas and electricity are two different forms of energy. With a gas-fired generating unit, gas may be converted into electricity. If the gas purchase cost and the gas-to-electricity conversion cost are less than the revenue from electricity sales, there is an opportunity for an arbitrage.
In the power industry, there could be many inconsistencies in electricity pricing, which provide arbitrage opportunities. However, many arbitrage opportunities are not perfect (riskless); that is, even though an arbitrage position looks like a "sure win", significant speculative elements (risks) could be involved. Two types of arbitrage opportunities may be exploited in the power industry: same-commodity arbitrage and cross-commodity arbitrage. The samecommodity arbitrage in the power market would include both spatial and temporal arbitrage. The spatial arbitrage refers to exploiting lateral variations in electricity spot prices. The price discrepancy among different regions within a market, or between different markets may provide such arbitrage opportunities. The temporal arbitrage refers to exploiting temporal differences between markets with different time horizons, considering the arbitrage between futures and spot markets. A futures contract is usually monthly, while a spot market is hourly. If there is a price discrepancy between these two markets, arbitrage opportunities could exist. However, this exists risk since spot price is very volatile. The cross-commodity arbitrage is aimed at different products within a market or different markets. For example, the arbitrage between gas market and electricity market, between power and steam, and between energy and ancillary service.
Distribution utilities face large risks in the competitive markets, especially those due to volatile electricity prices [20] . The effective risk hedging measures for the utilities include different types of flexible contracts [21] , such as: forward contracts, option contracts and their combination. The key to value electricity flexible contracts is modelling electricity spot prices. Due to the difficulty of accurately forecasting long-tern electricity prices, some financial approaches are employed to model the price process, e.g. Black-Scholes model which only considers historical prices influence just like stock prices, this model has been proved not suitable for electricity prices for electricity commodity's large differences from others. Meanreversion process is another approach to mainly represent the price's seasonal, weekly and daily periodical characteristics. Some more accurate approaches are under developing.
THE FRAMEWORK OF DISTRIBUTION MARKET OPERATION SYSTEM
The distribution utility deregulation brings significant changes to the original system operation mode, which make it essential to make power markets involve newly emerging technical and economical transactions like discussed above. We propose a whole market framework shown in Fig.1 and DMS, consumers' service information system, etc, are not indicated yet.
CONCLUSIONS
Numerous studies over two decades have mostly concentrated on generation competition and open access transmission, few are focused on distribution sector. There are experiences that have already dominated this unbalance not beneficial to sustainable and health development of power markets. This paper reviews main changes of distribution operation after deregulation, discusses several technical and economical problems faced by distribution utilities, and emphasizes the translations of load and price forecast, demand side bidding, distribution pricing, power quality, etc., from monopolized operation to marketing.
